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Abstract 
While there are many studies focusing on the impacts of various trade policy 
agreements across the world in the recent years, there is not much focus in the literature 
on the extent to which these agreements are implemented later, in terms of the aspects 
agreed upon therein. In this paper, we firstly identify the past achievements of the 
Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) in East Asian regions in terms of tariff 
removals and suggest future rooms for further economic benefits from trade 
liberalization in the region. Secondly, we provide the tariff concession dataset in the 
GTAP Data Base, which distinguishes the tariff removals agreed in these EPAs in East 
Asia but not implemented yet, from the existing overall tariffs in the benchmark year. 
As the standard GTAP Data Base only incorporates enforced tariff reductions through 
the base year applied tariffs, to analyse future trade integration, it might be worth it to 
integer commitments that are not yet implemented. We do that at the HS6 levels for East 
Asian EPAs that allows us to compare the economic impacts of partial versus complete 
implementation of the trade liberalization agreed in East Asian EPAs. Our results 
suggest that taking those commitments into account economically matters and that such 
satellite dataset might be taken as actual baseline for future policy simulations. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The movements of multi-Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) have accelerated 
since the beginning of 2013 in Asia-Pacific in addition to bilateral Free Trade 
Agreements (FTAs). The negotiations on the China-Japan-Korea FTA (CJKFTA) and 
the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) were launched. The 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiation was concluded in 2015. 
 
There have been several impact studies on the impacts of East Asian 
integration employing Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model simulations, 
those include Kawasaki (2015), Itakura and Lee (2012), and Petri, Plummer and Zhai 
(2012). However, there is not much focus in the literature on the extent to which these 
agreements are implemented later, in terms of the aspects agreed upon therein. This is 
an emerging key issue for assessing the economic impacts of Mega-RTAs, given 
numbers of bilateral and sub-regional agreements existing in the regions. 
 
The United States International Trade Commission (USITC) has conducted the 
most accurate study in this regard reporting the likely impact of TPP on the US 
economy in May 2016.6 It has used the tariff reduction scheduling data for TPP 
countries in Market Access Map (MAcMap) by the International Trade Centre (ITC)7 
prepared for the Global Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) 8  Research 
Consortium9. However, those tariff data developments have been limited to EPAs 
among TPP countries and the extension applying to other EPAs have been under 
construction. 
 
We identify the past achievements of the EPAs) in East Asian regions in terms 
of tariff removals and suggest future rooms for further economic benefits from trade 
liberalization in the region. In the following section 2, after a brief look at Asian 
regionalism, tariff concessions in Asian EPAs are described by countries and sectors 
comparing the initial and final levels of tariff protections. Section 3 presents CGE 
                                                   
6 See USITC (2016) 
7 http://www.macmap.org/ 
8 EPAs have intended to mean wider measures in East Asia than FTAs and RTAs including 
the elements of economic cooperation in addition to trade liberalization. 
9 http://www3.grips.ac.jp/~GlobalEPAsResearchConsortium/en/ 
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model simulations estimating the income gains from tariff reductions according to 
RCEP based on the baseline developed in this paper incorporating the tariff reduction 
schedules of existing EPAs. The paper concludes with Section 4. 
 
 
2. Descriptive evidence 
 
2.1 Asian regionalism 
 
East Asia has been a world growth centre for decades, and the unprecedented 
development of production networks particularly in the manufacturing sector has been 
progressing since the 1990s. East Asian countries, especially China and Association of 
South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) member countries, have individually adopted 
aggressive trade and investment-related policies in order to attract foreign direct 
investment and to utilize the globalizing market forces for achieving higher economic 
growth. Although these policies were not necessarily well-coordinated among the 
countries at the beginning, intensive effort toward regional economic integration in the 
form of EPAs has gradually developed since the 2000s, partially due to the stalled 
World Trade Organization (WTO) Doha Round. 
 
As presented in Chart 1, in 2000, there were only two EPAs among East Asia 
countries, namely Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement 
(ANZCERTA) and ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), whereas there are thirty EPAs in 
this region in 2015.  This includes several bilateral EPAs as well as five ASEAN+1 
EPAs: the ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA) enforced in 2005, the 
ASEAN-Korea Free Trade Agreement (AKFTA) in 2007, the ASEAN-Japan 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (AJCEP) in 2008, the ASEAN-India FTA 
(AIFTA) in 2010, and the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA (AANZFTA) in 2010. 
In addition to these existing EPAs, the ASEAN-10 and the six FTA partners of the 
ASEAN are currently engaged in the RCEP negotiation with a view to further 
strengthen a legal framework for securing de-facto economic integration in this region. 
Finally, China, Japan, and Korea has been negotiating a possible free trade agreement 
(CJK FTA) since 2013. 
 
Looking from a different angle, 115 out of 120 possible combinations of 
bilateral agreements in East Asia are already covered by EPAs concluded or 
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implemented. The remaining five combinations 10  also have either bilateral or 
plurilateral EPAs under negotiation such as CJK FTA and RCEP after TPP negotiation 
concluded in October 201511.  
 
On the other hand, as explained in the following section, this doesn’t 
necessarily mean that these EPAs resulted in complete elimination of tariffs among the 
member countries. It is not unusual for a country to fail to achieve 100% level of tariff 
elimination in an EPA negotiation due to politico-economic reasons. No matter how 
many partners a country enters into EPAs with, if the ratio of liberalized items is limited, 
then the economic gains from EPAs are likely to fall short of expectations. Therefore, it 
should be emphasized that conclusion of FTAs alone does not automatically bring the 
economic benefits to member countries. 
 
2.2 Tariff concession 
 
We provide the tariff concession dataset in the Global Trade Analysis Project 
(GTAP) database, which distinguishes the tariff removals agreed in these EPAs in East 
Asia but not implemented yet, from the existing overall tariffs in the benchmark year.  
The standard GTAP Data Base incorporates all in force tariff reductions that have been 
included in the agreements; however significant liberalization still has to be 
implemented. We have quantified the actual tariff removals in East Asian EPAs at HS6 
levels. These will be aggregated to GTAP sectoral level, to arrive at a GTAP-consistent 
                                                   
10 Australia-India, China-India, India-New Zealand, Japan-China, Japan-Korea. 
11 The TPP was signed on February 2016, but is still to be ratified. 
Source: Authors' compilation from various WEB sites
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tariff dataset that contains actually implemented tariffs in East Asia. This is suggested to 
be taken as the actual baseline for policy simulations in the future. 
 
By using a product-level preferential tariff dataset, we construct a new 
GTAP-compatible dataset of tariff concessions under existing East Asian EPAs. The 
level of tariff concessions for each sector to which a country is willing to commit is 
measured by the conventional level of tariff-elimination index (i.e. the share of 
duty-free tariff lines for a sector after the transition period).  
 
It should be noted that the original tariff data have some inconsistencies across 
the EPAs and countries for two reasons. First, some EPAs employ HS2002 version of 
tariff classification in the agreement texts, whereas others employ HS2007 version, 
depending on the timing of the negotiation. Second, as the most detailed tariff 
classifications (HS 8-10 digit) are not internationally standardized and are 
autonomously defined by each country, the total number of tariff lines at HS 8-10 digit 
level varies from one country to another. 
 
In order to make our data comparable across countries and EPAs, we first 
compute the share of duty-free tariff lines at HS 6 digit level, and then convert all the 
HS2002 based tariff data into HS2007 based data, using a correspondence table 
provided by the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) website.12 Finally, the data are 
aggregated to the GTAP sectoral level in order to implement our simulations. 
 
The data on preferential tariffs used in this paper are mainly taken from the 
ERIA (Economic Research Institute for the Association of ASEAN and East Asia) 
preferential tariff dataset (Kuno, 2011; Kuno et al, forthcoming), which covers 56 
country-level tariff schedules under the five existing ASEAN+1 FTAs: the 
ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA (AANZFTA), the ASEAN-China FTA (ACFTA), 
the ASEAN-India FTA (AIFTA), the ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership (AJCEP) and the ASEAN-Korea FTA (AKFTA). This is supplemented with 
the data on tariff commitments under the ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement (ATIGA), 
which are taken from the ASEAN Secretariat website, as well as the tariff data on some 
Japan's bilateral EPAs.  
 
                                                   
12 http://wits.worldbank.org/ 
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East Asian EPAs have “substantially covered” almost all commodities for tariff 
reductions, ranging from around 80% in India to 100% in Singapore, Australia and New 
Zealand (Table 1).  
 
2.3 Countries’ tariff protection 
 
2.3.1 Initial tariff protection 
 
To be consistent with the year of calibration of the GTAP model, we stick to 
2011 tariff data for descriptive purposes. This initial point is not the most recent, but it 
gives a rather closed picture of the actual situation (see Table 2). It presents the average 
tariffs (in ad valorem equivalent, AVE) applied by each country to its partners. The 
column “Ave.” refers by each ASEAN countries to all its regional partners and to the 
average tariff applied by each of the six remaining countries to the ASEAN10. To 
provide an overview of trade preferences within those countries, we also provide a table 
with the same structure, displaying most favoured nation (MFN) tariff rates (see Table 
A1 in appendix).  
 
Countries belonging to the region are rather heterogeneous in terms of 
development and their tariff patterns classically reproduce what is observed at the world 
level: developed countries are less protectionist than developing countries. Australia 
(0.34%), New Zealand (0.74%) and Japan (1.38%) apply the lowest level of tariffs to 
ASEAN countries. 
 
(%)
Importers Ave.
*
 BRN KHM IDN LAO MYS PHL SGP THA VNM AUS CHN IND JPN KOR NZL
BRN 98.2 - 99.2 99.2 99.2 99.2 99.2 99.2 99.2 99.2 99.3 98.4 86.2 98.2 99.2 99.3
KHM 94.6 98.5 - 98.5 98.5 98.5 98.5 98.5 98.5 98.5 90.8 90.2 88.5 85.3 91.0 90.8
IDN 93.5 98.8 98.8 - 98.8 98.8 98.8 98.8 98.8 98.8 94.7 92.5 52.1 92.2 92.1 94.7
LAO 84.3 80.0 80.0 80.0 - 80.0 80.0 80.0 80.0 80.0 93.1 97.7 80.3 86.8 90.1 93.1
MYS 96.3 98.9 98.9 98.9 98.9 - 98.9 98.9 98.9 98.9 97.6 93.7 80.9 95.0 93.0 97.6
PHL 89.9 99.1 99.1 99.1 99.1 99.1 0.0 99.1 99.1 99.1 96.1 92.8 82.2 97.7 90.0 96.1
SGP 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 - 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
THA 97.2 99.8 99.8 99.8 99.8 99.8 99.8 99.8 - 99.8 98.9 93.8 78.6 96.6 95.3 98.9
VNM 82.5 75.6 75.6 75.6 75.6 75.6 75.6 75.6 75.6 - 95.4 93.2 79.9 95.4 91.2 95.4
AUS 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 - n.a. - n.a. n.a. n.a.
CHN 95.1 95.1 95.1 95.1 95.1 95.1 95.1 95.1 95.1 95.1 n.a. - - - n.a. n.a.
IND 78.9 78.9 78.9 78.9 78.9 78.9 78.9 78.9 78.9 78.9 - - - n.a. n.a. -
JPN 93.7 89.5 93.6 94.2 93.6 94.6 95.2 93.4 94.7 94.6 n.a. - n.a. - - -
KOR 92.2 92.2 92.2 92.2 92.2 92.2 92.2 92.2 92.2 92.2 n.a. n.a. n.a. - - n.a.
NZL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 n.a. n.a. - - n.a. -
* Averages of RCEP countries for ASEAN countries and ASEAN countries for non-ASEAN countries (same in the following tables).
Source: Authors' estimates
Table 1 Tariff concessions in East Asian EPAs: number of commodities
Exporters
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According to the trade structure and the level of initial tariff, average protection 
varies across partners for a given importer. Thus, the country that faces the highest 
protection when exporting to Australia is Indonesia (2.1%). The other Australian 
partners face very low average tariffs (less than 0.2% in average). Protection in New 
Zealand exhibits a little variance, from free trade (which Brunei, Cambodia, Lao and 
Singapore benefit) to 2.6% applied to Vietnamese products. Japan applies low tariffs to 
its ASEAN neighbors, excepting Thailand which faces a 4.3% average tariff. 
 
China applies a fairly low level of protection to its ASEAN partners: 1.5%.  
Only Thailand (2.4%), Cambodia (2.7%) and Vietnam (4.6%) encounter average duties 
that are greater than 2%.India (17.9%) and Korea (4%) are globally more protectionist 
than their ASEAN partners. India remains the most protectionist country in the region, 
even if, since, mid-2000s, it has considerably reduced its custom duties. Cambodia is 
the ASEAN country that has the most limited market access to China (39.9%), followed 
by Indonesia (31.6%) and Malaysia (20.3%). 
 
Regarding ASEAN countries, those applying high duties inside the ASEAN 
block are the ASEAN4, that is Cambodia (11.6%), Lao (8.6%) and Vietnam (6.3%)13, as 
a result of their longer tariff dismantlement schedule within the ASEAN10, due to their 
lower level of development. Malaysia applies an average tariff of 3.8%, to its regional 
partners.  The rest of ASEAN countries apply intra-ASEAN tariffs lower, in average.  
Their openness to the “Six” is also limited, some countries being very protectionist, as 
                                                   
13 Myanmar is not considered in the tariff descriptive analysis as it belongs to a composite 
GTAP area. 
(%)
Importers Ave.
*
 BRN KHM IDN LAO MYS PHL SGP THA VNM AUS CHN IND JPN KOR NZL
BRN 2.7 - 1.3 4.3 1.1 3.0 3.4 2.1 5.6 0.5 2.6 3.9 0.4 8.0 2.3 1.8
KHM 11.6 14.2 - 6.5 13.9 11.7 11.1 15.6 12.7 12.9 10.8 10.1 8.3 16.5 11.1 11.2
IDN 2.1 0.0 0.0 - 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.2 1.3 1.8 4.6 1.2 3.7 7.2 1.4 4.4
LAO 8.6 2.6 15.2 5.7 - 3.8 3.4 20.0 6.9 3.1 7.6 10.2 16.2 19.8 24.7 6.3
MYS 3.8 1.8 8.0 1.7 0.1 - 1.3 1.0 1.6 4.0 2.6 3.6 4.4 8.9 6.4 2.6
PHL 2.1 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.1 - 0.0 2.8 20.3 1.1 0.9 7.9 2.0 1.3 0.9
SGP 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
THA 7.4 0.1 14.0 8.9 2.9 5.7 10.1 6.2 - 9.1 3.1 6.8 7.8 8.8 6.2 8.5
VNM 6.3 0.0 5.1 3.2 0.5 3.0 2.7 7.4 3.9 - 3.5 7.5 8.6 5.2 6.8 4.8
AUS 0.3 0.0 0.0 2.1 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 - n.a. - n.a. n.a. n.a.
CHN 1.5 0.0 2.7 1.4 1.8 1.0 0.2 0.4 2.4 4.6 n.a. - - - n.a. n.a.
IND 17.9 0.1 39.9 31.6 0.1 20.3 5.9 4.0 9.1 11.3 - - - n.a. n.a. -
JPN 1.4 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.6 0.3 1.2 3.1 4.3 1.0 n.a. - n.a. - - -
KOR 4.0 2.3 10.9 1.8 0.4 2.1 4.2 1.2 12.7 10.2 n.a. n.a. n.a. - - n.a.
NZL 0.7 0.0 0.0 1.7 0.0 0.9 1.4 0.0 1.5 2.6 n.a. n.a. - - n.a. -
Source: ITC's MAcMap database, trade weighted average, %. Authors' calculations.
Table 2 Bilateral AVEs of average applied tariffs, 2011
Exporters
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Cambodia, Lao or Thailand. Thus, bilateral levels of protection are asymmetrical, 
witnessing the progresses that can be made on the reciprocity of the EPAs: ASEAN 
countries apply higher tariffs in average to Australia, China, Japan and New Zealand 
than the opposite. Lastly, in 2011, Singapore appears as an extreme case as it is 
completely opened to all its partners in the region.  
 
2.3.2 Final tariff protection within EPAs 
 
Tariffs dismantlement within ASEAN and EPAs is still ongoing. Merging the 
information on the remaining of products whose duties still require to be removed 
within this framework, as explained in section 1, and actual tariffs makes it possible to 
compute the final tariff level, product by product, for each bilateral relationship. 
 
The full implementation of EPAs produces a different picture of the average 
protection in the region and between countries. Table 3 provides an overview of the 
situation in 2025, i.e. once all commitments are implemented. 
 
Comparing the initial and the final level of tariffs allows us to evaluate the 
tariff liberalization that will occur in those agreements. Tariff concessions in East Asian 
EPAs have not always been substantially high enough in terms of average tariff rates 
(Table 4), those would be much more effective than number of commodities (Table 1). 
 
On the ASEAN countries’ side, tariff protection decreases greatly when taking 
into account all commitments (except for Singapore which is already fully opened).  
Cambodia reduces spectacularly its average tariffs by more than 7.5 percentage points 
(%)
Importers Ave.
*
 BRN KHM IDN LAO MYS PHL SGP THA VNM AUS CHN IND JPN KOR NZL
BRN 0.5 - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.3 2.1 0.1 0.7 0.1 0.4
KHM 3.9 0.0 - 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.1 5.3 2.2 4.7 6.2 3.1 2.1 12.3 8.2 5.8
IDN 0.9 0.0 0.0 - 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.1 1.3 1.8 0.9 0.9 3.1 1.8 0.9 0.6
LAO 6.0 1.7 14.6 4.7 - 2.9 2.1 19.3 6.2 2.5 2.0 0.8 13.1 14.3 23.1 0.5
MYS 1.4 0.0 8.0 0.9 0.0 - 1.1 0.5 0.8 2.9 1.1 1.3 2.8 1.8 3.4 0.4
PHL 1.7 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.1 - 0.0 2.8 20.3 0.4 0.8 5.3 1.1 0.6 0.2
SGP 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
THA 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 - 0.9 0.1 1.3 4.9 4.2 1.3 0.8
VNM 2.9 0.0 4.8 2.3 0.4 2.2 1.9 7.2 3.2 1.8 2.2 3.5 1.6 3.2 0.9
AUS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 - n.a. - n.a. n.a. n.a.
CHN 1.2 0.0 2.7 1.3 1.8 0.8 0.1 0.3 2.0 2.9 n.a. - - - n.a. n.a.
IND 15.2 0.1 39.4 29.0 0.0 17.4 1.6 2.0 5.6 7.0 - - - n.a. n.a. -
JPN 0.9 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.6 2.9 2.6 0.5 n.a. - n.a. - - -
KOR 2.3 0.0 4.4 0.5 0.2 0.6 2.8 0.4 10.8 6.2 n.a. n.a. n.a. - - n.a.
NZL 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 n.a. n.a. - - n.a. -
Source: ITC's MAcMap database, trade weighted average, %. Authors' calculations.
Table 3 Bilateral average AVEs of applied tariffs after EPAs’ implementation
Exporters
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(hereafter pp), that is to say the average level is almost divided by 3. This country 
becomes very opened to its ASEAN neighbor (except vis-à-vis Singapore which still 
face more than 5% of average tariff when exporting to Cambodia). Thailand is also 
another country that experiences a large decrease in its tariff protection (from 7.4% to 
2.0%). Brunei also reduces significantly its tariffs and stabilizes its average protection to 
0.5% within the region. By implementing more ambitious commitments, Indonesia 
becomes more liberalized than Philippines. Both countries start with the same level of 
average protection (2.1%) but Indonesia ends with less than 1% whereas the level of 
protection of Philippines is 1.7%. Lao remains the most protectionist country in 
ASEAN: its average protection is 6% in average, after a decline of 2.6 pp. Vietnam 
more than halves its average protection (from 6.3% to 2.9%) and applies then a 
reasonable level of average custom duties, but it also remains a country that faces high 
tariffs when exporting to its partners (for example to Cambodia, Indonesia, Philippines 
or Thailand). 
 
Regarding the external 6 partners, Australia and New Zealand, which apply 
very low initial duties to ASEAN countries, now become completely opened to them. 
The openness is also important for Korea (from 4.0% to 2.3%) and Japan (from 1.4% to 
0.9%).  The ambition is moderated for India: average applied tariff remains high 
(15.2%) but undergoes a decrease by 2.7 pp. Finally, China offers the less additional 
openness to ASEAN countries (-0.3 pp), but the country applies fairly low custom 
duties to its ASEAN partners (1.2%) after implementation of its commitments. 
Asymmetries between ASEAN countries and their partners decrease along with the 
implementation of existing commitments. Except for India, ASEAN countries remains, 
however, more protected vis-à-vis the “six” whereas than the opposite. 
(%)
Importers Ave.
*
 BRN KHM IDN LAO MYS PHL SGP THA VNM AUS CHN IND JPN KOR NZL
BRN 80.3 - 100.0 99.8 100.0 97.3 100.0 78.8 100.0 100.0 87.5 46.4 69.0 91.7 93.8 80.8
KHM 66.6 100.0 - 98.8 97.1 97.4 99.3 66.0 82.4 63.4 42.9 68.9 74.8 25.2 26.7 48.3
IDN 57.5 - - - - 70.0 0.0 56.3 3.8 0.0 79.7 26.1 16.3 74.8 38.5 87.5
LAO 30.3 36.4 4.2 16.1 - 23.2 37.3 3.3 9.1 19.0 73.8 92.0 19.1 27.6 6.3 92.7
MYS 63.4 100.0 1.1 43.6 100.0 - 11.6 56.7 46.8 27.0 58.8 65.0 36.0 79.6 46.5 85.7
PHL 17.8 - 0.0 - - 0.0 - 0.0 0.0 0.0 62.2 7.7 33.8 45.2 55.8 81.2
SGP - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
THA 73.5 100.0 100.0 99.7 99.7 99.8 100.0 100.0 - 90.4 98.1 81.1 36.7 52.3 78.5 90.5
VNM 54.4 0.0 5.7 28.3 12.5 28.6 29.1 3.5 19.0 - 50.1 71.2 59.7 70.3 52.4 81.8
AUS 100.0 100.0 - 100.0 - 100.0 100.0 - 100.0 100.0 - n.a. - n.a. n.a. n.a.
CHN 21.2 - 1.5 9.2 0.6 19.2 45.5 32.4 17.2 35.5 n.a. - - - n.a. n.a.
IND 15.2 16.7 1.2 8.5 60.0 14.2 73.2 49.9 38.1 37.6 - - - n.a. n.a. -
JPN 34.1 - 62.5 19.4 37.7 12.5 52.4 8.9 40.3 49.0 n.a. - n.a. - - -
KOR 41.7 100.0 59.4 71.8 54.1 72.8 34.7 70.1 15.2 39.6 n.a. n.a. n.a. - - n.a.
NZL 100.0 - - 100.0 - 100.0 100.0 - 100.0 100.0 n.a. n.a. - - n.a. -
Source: ITC's MAcMap database, trade weighted average, %. Authors' calculations.
Table 4 Tariff concessions in East Asian EPAs: tariff rates
Exporters
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Finally, removing of tariff peaks (see table A2 in appendix) is not that 
ambitious as, once commitments are implemented. Indeed, even if it remains only 7,801 
duty lines exhibiting ad valorem equivalent of applied tariffs greater than 30%, 
Cambodia dramatically cut its tariff peaks as there remain only 1,006 of such tariffs, and 
so does Thailand (1,946 to 314) Vietnam (from 1,339 to 669) or, to a lesser extent, 
Brunei (from 255 to 129) and Lao (from 1,320 to 956). Other countries’ commitments 
are less ambitious: some countries almost do not cut or remove these tariffs (e.g. 
Indonesia or Malaysia) and Philippines do not cut at all its tariff peaks. On ASEAN’s 
partners’ side, ambition is moderated (China, India, Japan and Korea). Last, Australia 
and New Zealand remove the few they had.  
 
2.4 Sectoral tariff protection 
 
The average applied protection applied within ASEAN10 and their EPAs 
partners is, in average, 3.4% in 2011. The relatively low average hides however a 
heterogeneous average sectoral tariff protection. 
 
Within the region, agricultural trade is more protected in average (15.8%) than 
industrial trade (2.4%). However, some countries present some particularities: Australia 
and New Zealand protect more their industry (0.3% and 0.8%, respectively) than the 
agricultural sector (0.1% and 0.4% respectively). This remains an exception at the world 
level, the agriculture being generally protected by higher custom duties (especially 
specific tariffs or tariff rate quotas) than the industry, witnessing the important 
competitive advantages those two countries have in these sectors. 
 
The other ASEAN10’s partners follow the classical pattern observed 
worldwide: They clearly protect their agriculture with substantial custom duties. India 
(73.2% in agriculture, 4.9% in Non-agricultural Market Access (NAMA), i.e. industrial 
products) and Korea (41.6% and 1.9%) highly defend their internal markets, followed 
by Japan (18.5% and 0.2%). China is relatively the more opened countries, as its 
average tariff in agriculture is equal to 8.7% (0.8% in industry). 
 
Protection within the ASEAN10 is more homogenous: the average tariff in 
industry is half its level in agriculture, as for Brunei (the ratio average agricultural tariff 
on average industrial tariff is equal to 2.3), Indonesia (2.9), Thailand (2.5) or Malaysia 
11 
 
(2.1). Lao (1.5) and Vietnam (1.7) exhibit even lower differences between the two 
sectors.  Finally, Cambodia’s tariffs do not offer large variability at this sectoral level 
of aggregation, but as Australia and New Zealand, its agriculture market is more opened 
than its industrial one: the country applies, in average, 11.6% in industry and 11.1% in 
agriculture. 
 
Finally, even if a part of tariffs has already been removed (witnessed by the 
preferential margins one can see when comparing MFN tariffs and applied tariffs, see 
Table A2 in appendix), countries still highly protect a bunch of sensitive products. The 
number of tariff peaks (i.e. we choose an arbitrary value of the ad valorem equivalent of 
30% to define tariff peaks. Other values can also be found in the literature (50%, 100%) 
or on international organizations’ websites – e.g. 15%) is as high as 23,436 (on 656,349 
duty lines, once excluding products for which MFN duty is null). 10,416 concern the 
agricultural sector and non-agricultural market access have 13,020 of such tariffs. 
Cambodia is the one which use them the most frequently (13,328 duty lines, of which 
10,052 for industrial products). Australia and New Zealand have a few of those 
(respectively 8 and 3, all of them applied to manufactured products). Other details can 
be found in annex. 
 
The first important thing to notice in Table 5 is the ambition of liberalization 
exhibited by the EPAs: average tariff will go down by 49% (from 3.4% in 2011 to 1.7% 
once EPAs are implemented). Among the 43 GTAP sectors, 31 see their average tariffs 
reduced by more than a half. Five sectors experience a decline comprised between 25% 
and 50% and only seven are liberalized by less than a quarter. 
 
On the 31 most liberalized sectors, the tariffs of five of them are completely 
removed (-100%). However, these sectors have initially a very little average protection 
and concern mainly energy-related products. Two other sectors are also in this case: the 
sector “Wool” whose initial average tariff is not very high (2.2%) and the “sugar cane” 
sector (0.2%) are fully liberalized. 
 
Among the sectors with a significant drop in their protection and having an 
initial average tariff relatively important, the sectors related to the textile industry see 
their tariffs importantly removed: the “Wearing apparel” sector starts with a 8.8% 
average tariff that is reduced by -92.2%, the “textiles” sectors is protected by 5.7% that 
will be substantially reduced (-70.5%) and the “Leather products” (6.1% in 2011) will 
12 
 
see its average protection declining by 63.1%. Some agricultural sectors are also  
significantly liberalized. This is particularly the case for the sector “Animal products 
NEC” (3.8% in 2011, -90.1% after EPAs’ implementation), “wheat” (6%, -87.6%) and 
GTAP Code Sector Applied 2011 Applied 2025 Delta
gdt Gas manufacture and distribution 0.0 0.0 -100
oil Oil 0.5 0.0 -100
wol Wool. Silk-worm cocoons 2.2 0.0 -100
c_b Sugar cane and sugar beet 0.2 0.0 -100
gas Gas 0.2 0.0 -100
col Coal 0.6 0.0 -99.9
for Forestry 2.4 0.1 -95.8
ele Electronic equipment 0.4 0.0 -92.5
wap Wearing apparel 8.8 0.7 -92.2
oap Animal products NEC 3.8 0.4 -90.1
wht Wheat 6.0 0.7 -87.6
omn Minerals NEC 0.3 0.0 -87.6
nfm Metals NEC 1.1 0.1 -87.2
fmp Metal products 5.2 0.7 -86.6
ppp Paper products. Publishing 2.4 0.4 -83.6
ome Machinery and equipment NEC 2.5 0.4 -82.3
omf Manufactures NEC 3.8 0.8 -79.0
cmt Meat: Cattle, sheep, goats and horses 8.4 1.8 -78.6
tex Textiles 5.7 1.7 -70.5
osd Oil seeds 5.9 1.8 -69.0
mil Dairy products 4.0 1.3 -67.3
otn Transport equipment NEC 3.3 1.1 -67.2
ctl Cattle, sheep, goats and horses 2.5 0.8 -66.7
nmm Mineral products NEC 4.0 1.4 -63.8
pfb Plant-based fibers 0.0 0.0 -63.7
lea Leather products 6.1 2.2 -63.6
fsh Fishing 1.9 0.7 -63.1
crp Chemical, rubber and plastic products 2.9 1.1 -62.4
i_s Ferrous metals 5.5 2.1 -62.0
lum Wood products 3.1 1.4 -56.5
gro Cereal grains NEC 5.1 2.5 -51.0
ofd Food products NEC 7.5 3.8 -48.7
mvh Motor vehicles and parts 12.9 7.6 -40.7
p_c Petroleum and coal products 1.2 0.8 -33.7
pdr Paddy rice 11.4 8.0 -29.5
omt Meat products nec 8.4 6.2 -26.1
v_f Vegetables, fruit and nuts 12.1 9.5 -21.6
b_t Beverages and tobacco products 22.6 19.2 -15.2
ocr Crops NEC 12.4 10.5 -14.8
pcr Processed rice 39.9 34.8 -12.9
sgr Sugar 15.8 14.3 -9.7
vol Vegetable oils and fats 25.6 25.1 -2.1
ely Electricity 0.5 0.5 0
3.4 1.7 -49.0
Source: ITC's MAcMap database, trade weighted average, %. Authors' calculations
ALL
Table 5 Average AVEs of applied tariffs in 2011 and after EPAs’ implementation,
 by GTAP sectors
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the “white meat” sector (8.4%, -78.6%). 
 
However, the least significant declines also concern agricultural products and 
especially the sectors in which initial protection was strongest. The “processed rice” 
sector, for example, which has an initial protection of almost 40%, will still be highly 
protected after the implementation of the EPAs (the variation corresponds to -12.9%), 
the sector "vegetable oils and fats" (25.6%, -2.1%), the “tobacco and alcohol” (22.6% 
-15.2%) or the “sugar” products (15.8%, -9.7%). 
 
 
3. Scenarios and simulations 
 
3.1 The framework of a CGE model 
 
Using our specific dataset, we compare the economic impacts of partial versus 
complete implementation of trade liberalization agreed in East Asian EPAs. To analyze 
the economy-wide impact of trade liberalization, a CGE model of global trade is 
employed for the model simulations in this paper. The GTAP standard model, as well as 
the GTAP database, are utilized as a basis for the simulation experiments in this paper. 
 
A common criticism has often been that a standard CGE model focuses on the 
evaluation of static efficiency improvements and therefore the dynamic effects among 
production, income, and savings and investment are not captured. In fact, concerning 
the dynamic impact of trade liberalization, the growth effects through productivity gains 
and capital accumulation have been pointed out. In this paper, certain dynamic aspects 
are studied in the model simulations. 
 
One deals with the dynamic aspects of capital formation by modifying the 
standard version of the GTAP model.  Two mechanisms are considered in this paper.  
First, the important “dynamic” effects of capital accumulation are introduced into the 
standard static model. The initial increase in income is assumed to increase savings (a 
fixed proportion of additional income is saved) and investment. The induced savings 
and investment (larger capital stock) in turn link to production capacities and cause a 
further increase in income. Second, the trade balance is endogenously determined and 
international capital movement is allowed. It is assumed that the expected rate of return 
on capital is equalized among regions. 
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In addition to these, pro-competitive productivity growth effects are also 
investigated in the model simulations. It is assumed that the productivity of domestic 
industries increases in order to compensate for the lower import prices. Such a rate of 
productivity increase is set as equal to the rates of change in import prices weighted by 
the proportion of imports over total production, including domestic goods. 
 
3.2 Scenarios 
 
The GTAP Database provides well-arranged data on countries and regions in 
Asia-Pacific, such as Asian newly industrializing economies and ASEAN countries.  
One notable distinguishing feature of the model is its function to evaluate separately 
mutual dependence among the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) economies.  
The current GTAP Data Base (version 9.0, documented in Narayanan et al, 2015) 
consists of 57 disaggregated sectors and 140 economies, which are aggregated into the 
Countries and Regions Commodities
JPN Japan RIC Rice
CHN China GRA Grains
KOR Korea MET Bovine cattle, sheep and goat products
HKG Hong Kong, China MIL Dairy products
TWN Chinese Taipei SGR Sugar
BRU Brunei B_T Beverages and tobacco products
IDN Indonesia OAF Other primary
MYS Malaysia OPF Other processed foods
PHL Philippines MNG Mining
SGP Singapore TXL Textiles and wearing apparel 
THA Thailand CHM Chemical products
VNM Viet Nam MTL Metals
KHM Cambodia MVH Motor vehicles and parts
LAO Laos OTN Other transport equipment
IND India ELE Electronic equipment
AUS Australia OME Other machinery and equipment
NZL New Zealand OMF Other manufacturing
USA US CNS Construction
CAN Canada EGW Electricity, gas and water
MEX Mexico T_T Transportation
CHL Chile OSP Other private services
PER Peru OSG Public services
RUS Russia
EUM EU
OAO Other Asia
OAM Other America
ROW Rest of the world
Source: Authors' compilation based on GTAP Data Base version 9.0
Table 6 Geographical and sectoral aggregations
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appropriate version for the simulations. In this paper, as shown in Table 6, economies 
are aggregated into 27 regions, of which 20 regions are allocated to the APEC 
economies. The APEC economies are disaggregated individually where data are 
available (note that data on Papua New Guinea is unavailable). Commodities are 
aggregated into 22 sectors in accordance with the medium classifications of standard 
national accounts, while several sensitive commodities in the primary and food sectors 
are further disaggregated to some extent. 
 
The latest GTAP Database was released in May 2015. However, its base year 
remains 2011. The benchmark data used in this study were updated to 2015 in order to 
reflect the recently growing number of states counted in the world economy. Those data 
were downloaded from the Data and Statistics section of the website of the International 
Monetary Fund. 
 
We have simulated two scenarios of unilateral import tariff reductions of East 
Asian countries from trade partners in the region. The first one is a stylized one where 
import tariffs existed in 2011 would fully be removed. The second one is to reduce 
import tariffs based on existing East Asian EPAs discussed above. 
 
3.3 Results 
 
According to conventional simulations carried out by using a CGE model of 
global trade, EPA measures including tariff reductions will stimulate trade by lowering 
the prices of tradable goods. This will result in increases in the national output of 
exporting countries while increasing access to the market for trading partners.  
Meanwhile, domestic production resources—land, capital, labor, and intermediate 
inputs—will be used more efficiently in importing countries, particularly when 
domestic distortions, including those due to trade barriers, are reduced. These combined 
effects—one from foreign markets and the other from the domestic market—are 
expected to result in the expansion of production and an increase in income and welfare. 
In addition, economic benefits would expand dynamically through capital formation 
mechanisms and productivity improvements. Although negative impacts due to trade 
diversion effects and terms of trade effects are suggested by theoretical studies, 
empirical analyses, including model simulations, have generally indicated the 
macroeconomic benefits of EPAs. 
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Those economy wide impacts of tariff removals will largely be determined by  
the magnitude of tariff reductions. The more tariff would be reduced, the more imports 
Importers Ave.
 BRN KHM IDN LAO MYS PHL SGP THA VNM AUS CHN IND JPN KOR NZL
BRN 3.77 - 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.19 0.00 1.93 0.23 0.00 0.01 0.54 0.12 0.32 0.36 0.00
KHM 8.65 0.00 - 0.01 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.21 1.86 1.45 0.01 4.10 0.09 0.11 0.60 0.01
IDN 0.52 0.00 0.00 - 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.19 0.03 0.00
LAO 1.43 0.00 0.00 0.00 - 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.52 0.05 0.01 0.85 0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.00
MYS 2.39 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 - 0.13 0.19 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.70 0.05 0.77 0.43 0.01
PHL 8.63 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 - 0.96 0.05 0.37 0.34 2.03 0.86 1.97 2.05 0.00
SGP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 - 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
THA 5.58 0.00 0.02 0.33 0.02 0.46 0.24 0.49 - 0.23 0.06 1.84 0.19 1.38 0.29 0.01
VNM 3.66 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.14 0.00 - 0.02 2.35 0.17 0.16 0.77 0.00
AUS 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 - n.a. - n.a. n.a. n.a.
CHN 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 n.a. - - - n.a. n.a.
IND 0.87 0.00 0.00 0.53 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.04 0.03 0.05 - - - n.a. n.a. -
JPN 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 n.a. - n.a. - - -
KOR 0.63 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.04 0.16 0.31 n.a. n.a. n.a. - - n.a.
NZL 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 n.a. n.a. - - n.a. -
Source: Authors' simulations
Importers Ave.
 BRN KHM IDN LAO MYS PHL SGP THA VNM AUS CHN IND JPN KOR NZL
BRN 1.39 - 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.28 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.05 0.26 0.32 0.00
KHM 6.81 0.00 - 0.01 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.21 1.86 1.45 0.00 2.81 0.06 0.00 0.19 0.00
IDN 0.14 0.00 0.00 - 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.08 0.02 0.00
LAO 1.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 - 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.03 0.01 0.82 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00
MYS 1.32 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 - 0.00 0.15 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.48 0.00 0.56 0.09 0.00
PHL 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 - 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.07 0.09 0.00
SGP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 - 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
THA 0.47 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.00 - 0.03 0.05 0.26 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
VNM 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 - 0.00 0.23 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.00
AUS 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 - n.a. - n.a. n.a. n.a.
CHN 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 n.a. - - - n.a. n.a.
IND 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 - - - n.a. n.a. -
JPN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 n.a. - n.a. - - -
KOR 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.01 n.a. n.a. n.a. - - n.a.
NZL 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 n.a. n.a. - - n.a. -
Source: Authors' simulations
(%)
Importers Ave.
  BRN KHM IDN LAO MYS PHL SGP THA VNM AUS CHN IND JPN KOR NZL
BRN 36.9 - 62.6 69.5 0.0 50.3 51.9 14.6 89.3 5.0 12.4 24.7 39.5 80.3 89.0 22.7
KHM 78.7 96.3 - 100.8 100.0 100.1 100.1 100.0 99.9 100.0 43.8 68.6 64.6 2.7 31.1 1.2
IDN 26.2 - 96.9 - - 70.2 0.0 1.5 0.4 0.0 85.2 17.9 4.4 44.4 52.3 n.s.
LAO 73.4 - 2.4 n.s. - 23.6 1.3 9.2 32.0 55.1 59.3 96.7 86.1 n.s. n.s. 94.2
MYS 55.5 99.1 5.1 n.s. 100.0 - 0.5 79.8 31.4 18.8 74.2 68.0 5.6 72.8 20.1 69.7
PHL 26.8 - - 2.5 - 0.0 - 15.3 0.0 0.0 97.2 0.0 23.3 36.0 44.9 n.s.
SGP - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
THA 8.3 14.0 82.8 8.5 17.5 9.1 3.0 0.8 - 11.3 77.6 13.9 0.0 1.1 2.8 79.5
VNM 10.4 n.s n.s. 8.9 n.s. 32.8 32.1 16.4 n.s. - 2.2 9.6 15.8 23.1 7.3 n.s.
AUS 100.0 0.0 100.0 - - 100.0 100.0 - 100.0 100.0 - n.a. - n.a. n.a. n.a.
CHN 20.5 0.0 0.2 n.s. -3.0 5.9 n.s. 29.7 11.9 63.9 n.a. - - - n.a. n.a.
IND 3.2 0.0 0.0 3.6 0.0 1.5 34.1 6.0 5.2 2.5 - - - n.a. n.a. -
JPN n.s. 0.0 68.6 n.s. 0.0 0.9 n.s. n.s. 0.1 20.8 n.a. - n.a. - - -
KOR 11.1 91.7 n.s. 3.4 2.9 87.3 n.s. 97.4 2.8 3.9 n.a. n.a. n.a. - - n.a.
NZL 100.0 18.0 100.0 100.0 - 100.0 100.0 - 100.0 100.0 n.a. n.a. - - n.a. -
Source: Authors' simulations
Exporters
Table 7 Changes in equivalent variations according to tariff removals
(% of GDP)
Table 8 Changes in equivalent variations according to EPAs tariff reductions
(% of GDP)
Table 9 Tariff concessions in East Asian EPAs: income gains
Exporters
Exporters
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would be boosted and domestic production may be replaced but the more real income 
and consumption could be stimulated by lower import costs on the other hand. The 
over-all impacts of unilateral tariff reductions would generally be expected to result in 
the improvements of economic welfare at the macro level.  
 
Estimated income gains from full tariff removals by East Asian countries are 
shown in Table 7 by the source countries of imports. Those magnitudes vary widely 
among ASEAN countries reflecting the differences in initial tariff rates discussed above 
and other six countries (Australia, China, India, Japan, Korea and New Zealand) would 
gain less than AESAN countries. In contrast, income gains from remaining tariff 
reductions according to East Asian EPAs (Table 8) would generally be limited except 
smaller East Asian countries as a result of major implementation of existing EPAs until 
2011. The ratios of income gains by remaining tariff reductions according to existing 
East Asian EPAs relative to those by full tariff removals are shown in Table 9. It is 
indicated in Chart 2 that those are more or less proportional to the rates of tariff 
concessions in terms of trade weighted average tariff rates (Table 4) rather than those at 
tariff line levels (Table 1). 
 
 That said, the ratio of tariff concessions in terms of income gains as well as 
trade weighted average tariff rates would not be substantially high enough as those in 
terms of number of commodities at tariff line levels. As discussed above, final tariff 
rates after implementing existing EPAs would not be so much lower. 
 
Moreover, the differences in those tariff concessions are observed both at 
average ratios among East Asian countries and according to trade partners of individual 
Source: Authors' estimates and simulations
Chart 2 Tariff concessions: comparison of three measurements
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East Asian countries reflecting specific trade structure. 
 
 The income gains from tariff reductions according to RCEP are also compared 
among ASEAN and other six countries in Table 10. It is suggested that ASEAN 
countries have already committed major tariff reductions within ASEAN and in 
ASEAN+1 EPAs in the past. Income gains of ASEAN countries from existing East 
Asian EPAs are estimated to account for 10 to 70 per cent of full tariff removals. 
However, additional income gains from full tariff removals would still be sizable. On 
the other hand, other six countries would benefit much more from future RCEP. East 
Asian countries as a whole would remain benefit largely from future trade liberalization 
in the region. In order to estimate such impacts of future EPAs, accurate baselines for 
tariff rates will be essential. 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
Standard data and modelling approaches in global trade analysis do not factor 
in the tariff concessions that have actually being implemented in reality, apart from the 
conventional FTAs. This may have a tendency to overestimate the macro-economic and 
sectoral effects of FTAs in the future. We address this problem in this paper, focusing on 
East Asia and Pacific. 115 out of 120 possible combinations of bilateral agreements in 
East Asia are already covered by EPAs concluded or implemented. Those East Asian 
 (% of GDP, %)
 From 2011 Past EPAs Additional Past ratio
Brunei 5.3 2.2 3.1 41.5
Cambodia 11.0 8.1 3.0 73.5
Indonesia 2.2 0.4 1.8 17.0
Lao 4.2 1.3 2.9 31.1
Malaysia 3.8 1.6 2.2 41.7
Philippines 0.9 0.3 0.5 39.6
Singapore 2.9 0.8 2.0 29.6
Thailand 6.4 0.6 5.8 10.1
Viet Nam 6.1 1.3 4.8 21.3
Australia 1.6 0.1 1.5 5.2
China 0.6 0.0 0.6 3.5
India 1.6 0.0 1.6 -0.1
Japan 1.6 0.1 1.5 6.4
Korea 5.3 0.1 5.2 1.9
New Zealand 1.9 0.2 1.8 8.6
Source: Authors' simulations
Table 10 Income gains from East Asian tariff reductions
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EPAs have “substantially covered” various commodities for tariff reductions ranging 
from around 80 per cent in India to 100 per cent in Singapore, Australia and New 
Zealand measured in terms of tariff lines at HS 6 digit levels. 
 
That said, tariff reductions in East Asia vary significantly in terms of the initial 
and final levels of tariff rates as well as the degrees of tariff cuts. By sectors, the least 
significant declines in tariff concern agricultural products and especially the sectors in 
which initial protection was strongest. Tariff concessions in East Asian EPAs have not 
substantially been high enough in terms of trade weighted average tariff rates those 
would be much more effective in economics than number of commodities. 
 
The ratios of income gains by remaining tariff reductions according to existing 
East Asian EPAs relative to those by full tariff removals indicate that those are more or 
less proportional to the rates of tariff concessions in terms of average tariff rates rather 
than those at tariff line levels. East Asian countries would remain benefit largely from 
future trade liberalization in the region. In order to estimate such impacts of future 
EPAs, accurate baselines for tariff rates will be essential. 
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6. Annex Incorporation of Tariff Concessions data into GTAP Data 
 
Using the adjusted tariff dataset prepared from the ITC/CEPII MacMAP 
dataset, we modify GTAP Data Base. This is done by using Altertax tool, which is 
described in Malcolm (1998). It involves the following steps: 
 
Firstly, we compute the shocks in power of tariffs required to modify the tariff 
rates in GTAP Data Base into those implied in the adjusted tariff dataset. Powers of 
tariffs are defined as the ratio of Value of Imports at Market Prices (VIMS) to Value of 
Imports at World Prices (VIWS); the difference between these two values is the tariff 
revenue. The alternative and equivalent way of calculating power of tariffs is (1+tariff 
rates). We use this method to calculate the adjusted power of tariffs. 
 
Secondly, we turn to the standard GTAP model and define a closure that 
changes nothing much in the data other than the matrix involving the Value of Imports 
at Market Prices (VIMS). Shocking the tariffs in the standard GTAP model closure 
would change a lot of prices and quantities, since this would be a tariff reduction policy 
exercise. Such a situation should be avoided, since we merely want to change the tariff 
rates, nothing else in the data. This is why we use this alternative closure, which 
essentially fixes the ratio of change in trade balance to income and uses unitary 
elasticities across the board. 
 
Thirdly, we run the simulation of shocks calculated in the first step within the 
closure defined in the second step, in the standard GTAP model. We employ the final 
VIMS matrix from the updated data of this simulation, to replace the VIMS in GTAP 
Data Base for our policy simulations. 
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Appendix 
 
 
 
 
 
(%)
Importers Ave.
*
 BRN KHM IDN LAO MYS PHL SGP THA VNM AUS CHN IND JPN KOR NZL
BRN 4.0 - 2.1 7.8 4.4 4.7 6.8 4.3 7.4 1.7 2.6 4.6 0.4 8.0 2.3 1.8
KHM 11.6 14.2 - 6.5 13.9 11.7 11.1 15.6 12.7 12.9 10.8 10.1 8.3 16.5 11.1 11.2
IDN 5.4 0.1 10.8 - 6.5 3.7 5.3 3.0 10.5 6.0 4.6 5.8 5.3 7.2 4.7 4.4
LAO 13.7 9.7 20.5 11.7 - 10.3 8.9 24.5 13.6 11.9 7.6 11.4 16.2 19.8 24.7 6.3
MYS 6.1 3.8 12.9 6.7 0.9 - 3.7 3.2 8.8 8.1 2.6 6.0 4.4 8.9 6.4 2.6
PHL 6.3 0.5 10.0 9.6 5.4 4.3 - 2.1 13.3 29.2 4.1 4.8 8.7 4.1 2.9 3.8
SGP 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 - 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
THA 7.4 0.1 14.0 8.9 2.9 5.7 10.1 6.2 - 9.1 3.1 6.8 7.8 8.8 6.2 8.5
VNM 8.7 0.0 7.7 11.0 1.8 9.6 7.5 10.9 11.9 - 3.5 9.2 9.3 5.9 7.0 4.8
AUS 2.5 0.0 8.4 2.3 0.4 1.6 2.9 0.8 6.3 1.1 - n.a. - n.a. n.a. n.a.
CHN 4.9 0.3 10.9 4.3 2.3 3.1 2.0 4.1 6.5 15.2 n.a. - - - n.a. n.a.
IND 18.6 0.1 45.1 31.6 2.1 20.3 5.9 6.3 10.3 11.3 - - - n.a. n.a. -
JPN 2.4 0.0 31.0 0.9 9.5 0.8 2.8 3.6 5.5 3.6 n.a. - n.a. - - -
KOR 5.5 3.0 14.9 3.2 1.6 3.5 5.6 2.7 14.4 13.0 n.a. n.a. n.a. - - n.a.
NZL 1.3 0.0 8.8 1.8 4.0 0.9 1.4 0.8 3.1 2.7 n.a. n.a. - - n.a. -
Source: ITC's MAcMap database, trade weighted average, %. Authors' calculations.
Table A1 Average AVEs of MFN tariffs, 2011
Exporters
Importer Sector TP_2011 TP_2025 Importer Sector TP_2011 TP_2025
BRN ALL 255 129 AUS ALL 8
BRN Agriculture 250 128 AUS NAMA 8
BRN NAMA 5 1 CHN ALL 410 389
IDN ALL 262 235 CHN Agriculture 287 278
IDN Agriculture 247 230 CHN NAMA 123 111
IDN NAMA 15 5 IND ALL 1,360 1,155
KHM ALL 13,328 1,006 IND Agriculture 753 753
KHM Agriculture 3,276 213 IND NAMA 607 402
KHM NAMA 10,052 793 JPN ALL 779 746
LAO ALL 1,320 956 JPN Agriculture 759 726
LAO Agriculture 963 739 JPN NAMA 20 20
LAO NAMA 357 217 KOR ALL 1,416 1,353
MYS ALL 797 639 KOR Agriculture 1,405 1,351
MYS Agriculture 392 392 KOR NAMA 11 2
MYS NAMA 405 247 NZL ALL 6
PHL ALL 210 210 NZL NAMA 6
PHL Agriculture 210 210
THA ALL 1,946 314
THA Agriculture 1,414 234
THA NAMA 532 80
VNM ALL 1,339 669
VNM Agriculture 460 197
VNM NAMA 879 472
Source: ITC's MAcMap database
ASEAN COUNTRIES ASEAN's PARTNERS
Table A2 Number of tariff peaks, by importing country and large sectors
